How to Check Social Security Number?

How to Check Social Security Number?

How to Check Social Security Number

Surely you have needed at some point your social security identification number. Even if you do not believe it and do not be aware, the number of social security is used very frequently is our daily life, whether it is when requesting medical care, buying prescription drugs, registering as workers, collecting benefits and in others many cases. In each of these actions, we are identified with the unique number of social security as well as the dni or nie.

Every citizen has a social security number regardless of age and if he has a work history or not, we all have a code through which we are identified in the SS.

This number is important to have it always on hand or have it pointed in some place that we know, since you do not know when they can ask for the code for any procedure or management with social security.

If you do not know your number, in this article we explain step by step how to know your social security number. It is not a complex or difficult process, you will only need some documents and follow some simple steps that we will indicate to you next.

What documents do I need to request the SS number?

Mainly depends on the method that we use to make the request, but as a general rule, to ask for the number you will only need your ID or passport and the health card.

Who can apply for worker’s affiliation?

At the request of the employer, for those workers who join for the first time to work in your company and are not affiliated to social security.
By request of the worker
Of course, by the Treasury itself

How can I get my Social Security number

There are several methods for getting the membership number. Here are the different forms available. Also we will mention some documents that you possibly have in house in which appears the code of the social security.

Methods to request the number Social Security

  • Introducing yourself in any SS Administration. You may have to make an appointment to avoid problems.
  • Through the Electronic Headquarters, through the option of Duplicate of Document of Affiliation by SMS. If you use this method it is necessary to have previously communicated to the General Treasury your mobile phone number.
  • Calling the social security user’s phone number. In this case you will be asked for your personal data (name, surname and ID).

Where can I find the SS number

  • In any payroll, either current or old.
  • In the document of resolution of the unemployment.
  • Work life, another document where also the social security number appears.
  • In the health card, in prescriptions issued by the doctor or by going to the nearest clinic.

We have to clarify that the social security number does not always appear on the health card. Normally this card is generated from the code of affiliation to Social Security, therefore, in many cases the number of affiliation with the code that appears on the health card usually matches.

In addition to this important detail, we must look at two other numbers that appear on the card to identify the code of the province where the affiliation was made and a sequential number. If your health card shows the letter “B” behind the longest number, it receives health care as a beneficiary (child not working or student, spouse, etc.) of another person.

Social security itself can override a number if it detects that it was granted without a right to do so. This is often the case in some cases, such as documentary falsification and phishing.

Discover all The Cards of Clash Royale

Clash Royale Card

Today we bring you the guide of all the cards of Clash Royale that we are going to find in this game. If you still do not know it you can read our Analysis of Clash Royale.

To begin with let’s explain that this game has constant updates and improvements, initially had only 42 cards divided into three groups but their number has been increasing. Currently these cards can be of four different types:

  • Common
  • Specials
  • Epic
  • Legendary

These cards are going to be able to be unlocked as we ascend in the different arenas that Clash Royale brings us, these arenas would be equivalent to the leagues that exist in the game also of Supercell: Clash of Clans. Each arena will bring us a different type of cards that we can get, this does not mean that we can not get the cards offered in the previous arenas, but as we go up in league there will be more cards that we can get at that time.

We will have 2 ways to get the cards, the first is through coffers that the game with use this clash royale hack generator will give us every time we win a battle, when we collect a certain number of crowns or every “x” time, here it is important to know that The coffers we win after the battle will only have only four holes to open them and they will only be able to open one by one.

There are several types of coffers in Clash Royale:

  • Free safe
  • Silver chest (3 hours opening)
  • Golden Box (8 hours opening)
  • Crown casket (we need 10 won crowns in battles)
  • Giant Safe (12 hours opening)
  • Magic Box (12 hours opening)
  • Super Magical Safe
  • Epic Chest (will appear promptly in the store and after battle)
  • Legendary Safe (will appear promptly in the store and after battle)

And the second way is to buy cards that the game is going to offer randomly in the store and that will be updated every 24 hours, we will offer a letter of each type where the price will vary depending on the card.

Common Letters of Clash Royale

Archer
The famous and mythical Clash of Clans archers are a pair of unshielded remote attackers that will help you by attacking both ground and air troops. This card is unlocked in the training field (tutorial).

If we choose the archers at the time of attack we will loose two. It is advisable to throw them behind a unit with much life that serves as “tank” so that the archers can do enough damage to the target. Although they are one of the basic Clash of Clans troops here are the ones that do the most damage.

Bomber
Little skeleton with more life than usual that will help us with a swarm of enemies. The Bomber is going to be able to unlock him in the training camp, this skeleton is very special, since it does not immolate but it is going to throw one bomb after another which will wreak havoc on the enemy troops due to its enormous splash damage.

This skeleton we will be able to use it to defend our troops, although also it does much damage to the towers of archers.

Knight
The knight is also going to be able to unlock him in the training camp, it is a troupe that owns a great sword and a great mustache very similar to the one of the barbarians but with a style of fight more elegant and like more developed.

The gentleman due to its low cost in elixir and its ample life we can use it to protect troops that we will release behind its back and that will devastate with what they are.

Arrows
Another card that we can unlock in the training camp and as its name suggests is a shower of arrows that will stop big bosses of enemies but with little life.

This rain will help us a lot when we face a great wave of enemies like skeletons and goblins, but it will not help us attacking towers as their damage is reduced in those objectives. These small details must be taken into account during the game.

Goblins with Spears
Who thought it would be a good idea to teach these three goblins to throw spears? This card we will be able to unlock in Arena 1, this card will consist of three identical elves that we will be very useful as units of support both offensive and defensive.

They are especially useful to be able to finish with the units of air and to be able to defend our towers. In the offensive aspect are troops that behind those that have much life will do enough damage to the enemy towers.

Goblins
These are going to be three very fast attackers without armor and with enough attack. This card can be obtained in Arena 1.

These Goblins are very effective as distraction for the troops that have much attack and on the contrary do much damage in troops and buildings when nobody is threatening them and they are attacking at will. The most remarkable and maximum virtue is that it is a very fast troop as happened in Clash of Clan, to take advantage of this must be present in our attacks.

Skeletons
Four very weak and fast melee fighters. This card can be unlocked in Arena 2.

This card is a pack of four skeletons that will help you against the troops with a high rate of damage and life, but with a slow movement like the Mini P.E.K.K.A, P.E.K.K.A or the prince. Use them wisely and above all try to find the right moment so that your slight movement does not affect you in your strategy.

Minions
Three flying attackers with little life and very fast, some blue minions that will crush everything in their path, unless they prevent it.

This card is unlockable in Arena 2. The minion is a gargoyle with big horns, short wings and large hands with sharp claws covered with dark elixir. Minions must be used behind cards with enough life as the giant, since you can not do much alone.

Cannon
Its own name indicates it, a cannon that we will plant to defend in front of our towers of defense. The cannon we can unlock in Arena 3, the first games will be hard without the great help of the cannon but the joy of obtaining it will reward your effort.

The cannon is a card that falls into the category of defensive buildings, with ground troops there will be no problem but beware of flying troops as in Clash of Clans cannons do not attack this type of troops so match your defenses .

Barbarians
One orb of four barbarians will go out to defend or attack other enemy buildings. Barbarians, unlike Clash of Clans, are one of the most powerful units that we find in Clash Royale, finally have the role they deserve.

We will use them both on low sands and high sands. They have a lot of life and great damage, they will be a card with a high weight inside the game, but watch out for the cards that do splatter damage or the barbarians will last less than expected.

Tesla
Another of the cards are considered as defensive buildings within Clash Royale. Controlling the electricity we will try to stop the continuous and incessant attacks of our enemy. The tesla we can unlock in Arena 4.

The Tesla tower will be a defensive building that will be hidden where it can not receive damage, will only receive damage when it comes to the surface and the only way to surface is when the enemy troops are within their range of attack.

Minion Horde
Exactly with the same characteristics that the normal letter of the henchmen only that instead of three minions you will invoke to six.

Logically having a higher number of henchmen will be a more expensive card but will do much more damage than the simple card of the minions. You must think very well which one you should choose for your battles, the simple card or the hordes of henchmen, a decision that may decide the future of your game, well not so much but that you must keep in mind, I think you have already understood what I wanted With my words.

Discharge
One of the four cards that are going to be spells, you can stop your little enemies with a simple Zap. A small lightning that in a reduced radius will kill the enemy troops with little life and will give you a respite when defending your buildings.

The effect produced by the attack of the discharge is very similar to the attack of the lightning spell of Clash of Clans in its initial levels. It is difficult not to make many comparatives with his older brother since they are basically his characters with a few new additions.

The Mortar
A defensive building with a lot of range that will literally crush the enemy defensive towers from your side of the battle, due to its wide radius and its enormous amount of damage. The mortar is a card that you can unlock in Arena 6.

Because of this, the life of the mortar has been reduced to 20 seconds, but 20 seconds in which you can crush the enemy, but watch out for the flying troops as they are your weak point.

Royal Giant
The Royal Giant enters the battlefield like an elephant in a china store, firing with its huge cannon at any enemy structure. Do not trust that this giant does not have to reach the end of the road. The Royal Giant is a card that we will unlock in Arena 7.

Do not be discouraged to have less life than the normal Giant, just keep in mind that this Royal Giant is going to shoot from far away to the enemy tower, take care to protect it well with other types of troops and you will shake your enemies.

Fire Spirits
In launching this letter appear three fiery spirits prepared for death. They will launch at your enemies and explode causing damage instantly. Its low elixir cost will earn you a place in your deck, only two elixir.

Fire spirits are unlocked in Arena 5. They attack both air and ground targets causing splash damage, the only point against this card is that they have very little life and are helpless before the towers if they face the same as Before the attack of archers or the arrows.

Ice Spirit
This card generates a mischievous ice spirit that freezes a group of enemies. Winter is coming… . An ice chart that was needed and can be very useful for 1 single elixir.

This card we will be able to unlock in Arena 8 from the 2300 drinks, this solitary spirit will use it to freeze both a troop and a large group for 2 seconds and for just a droplet of elixir, certainly a great letter that Will give much play in the different strategies. Its reach of land and air and is a great combination with magicians.

Elite Barbarians
In releasing this card we generate a pair of high level barbarians. They are normal barbarians but harder, faster and stronger. The elite barbarians are unlocked in Arena 7 and their targets are only terrestrial.

They have more life than the common barbarians and are able to survive a fireball or a ZAP but if we face them against four barbarians of the same level the barbarians will win. The card with the best that can be compared is the mini P.E.K.K.A. And if we face them, the elite barbarians win. Anyway it is very expensive and compared it is much better to buy a mini P.E.K.K.A.

The truth is that Supercell has included a variety of cards, it is noticeable that things are well thought out, a short number of letters would have been the cause of the failure of a great game. On the next page we will talk about the Clash Royale Special Letters.

Telephone Social Security: Telephone Number Information TGSS

Telephone Social Security

If you need the social security telephone, either to ask for a working life or for any other official procedure with TGGS, then we give you the necessary details so that you can contact the social security number.

If you need to do any management personally in the TGSS, you should know that it is mandatory to request prior appointment in social security.

  • Social Security Telephone Hours
  • Social security has a face-to-face schedule for tomorrow. However, if you need telephone assistance or to make an appointment, you can call at any time of the day, because if you call outside of a telephone call to speak with an agent, you will be assisted by an automatic system with voice recognition.

If you just want to speak with an operator and not with the automatic system, you must call from Monday to Friday from 9.00 to 14.00 hours.

Social Security Telephone

The telephones that the social security offers for telephone service or to request previous appointments have shared costs, that is to say, the cost of the call is distributed between the user and the TGSS, but even so, they are cheaper than the 902, where the cos Of the call is paid in full by the user or the person making the call. This type of telephone number used by social security, which is common in public administration. The part of the cost that corresponds to the user may depend on the rate that has contracted with the operator.

There are different phones for the different operations that you want to perform. Here are all your phones:

  • Telephone for pensions and other benefits INSS: 901 16 65 65
  • Telephone for automated pre-appointments for pensions and other INSS: 901 10 65 70
  • For affiliation to the SS, ask for the working life by telephone, inscriptions, collections, deferrals and general information, you must call 901 50 20 50

Free Social Security Phone

All phones with additional cost, have a free equivalent depending on the province. In this case, there are numbers of social security telephone numbers. The above telephone numbers are the general telephone numbers for talking to the central office. But if you call directly to one of its offices, the call will not have additional costs as it will be a call to a provincial fixed number.

To see the phone number of your nearest or closest office, you must use the office finder. Once the details of your TGSS office have been opened, the free social security number will appear.

Clash of Clans: Offensive and Defensive Strategy with Air Defenses and Hidden Tesla

We continue one more day talking about the defensive structures of Clash of Clans and the different defensive and offensive strategies against these structures. The last day we were talking about mortars and towers of wizards so today we will squarely with Air Defenses and Hidden Tesla, two defenses that can give a lot of game.

The air defenses and the Hidden Tesla are structures with very interesting advantages. The first is a very effective defense against balloons and dragons while the Tesla plays with the surprise factor to destroy offensive strategies.

Air Defenses

Air Defenses

Air defense is the only defensive construction that attacks only air units. It has a very large radius of attack and its damage per second is quite high. Its weak point is, precisely, its weakness before terrestrial troops:

  • Defense: Due to its great range of attack, the best defensive strategy with aerial defenses is to place them so that they cover all possible stores and the city hall. Until level 8 of the town hall we will not have three air defense units, so until that time we will have to try to adapt the village so that the two units available cover everything. These structures are often the number one target when the attacker has an offensive strategy based on balloons and dragons, so it is advisable to surround the air defenses of other defensive structures.
  • Attack: If you attack with aerial troops your first objective must be to disable the aerial defenses and any terrestrial troops you serve for it. Although dragons suffer with these defenses, it has nothing to do with balloons, since air defenses can destroy any balloon with a couple or three shots, so keep them off.

Hidden Tesla

hidden tesla clash of clans

Halfway between a trap and a defensive building, the Hidden Tesla is a powerful weapon because of the surprise factor, being hidden until the enemy units approach and because it does not need to be recharged as the traps. The Tesla has a decent range of action although that range decreases when it is hidden and unactivated.

  • Defense: As we have already said, the biggest advantage of Hidden Tesla is the surprise factor. Placing them in a good position can be decisive in the defense of the village, so the most important thing is to avoid making it easy to guess their position. Closing them in 2 × 2 boxes can make their position very evident so it is advisable to make visible several sites where a Hidden Tesla could fit to confuse the adversary. When you are improving a Hidden Tesla, it will be visible to your enemies, thus discovering their position, so better leave them out of the village while the improvement is made.
  • Attack: All the opposite that in the defense. You should avoid any site that seems suspicious of containing a Hidden Tesla. Keep in mind that the hidden Tesla only activates if you are in your range or the village you are attacking suffers a 50% damage.

With these tips, less remains to complete all the defensive constructions of the village. In the coming days we will continue talking about the most destructive buildings by using the amazing clash of clans hack tool, if you have questions do not hesitate to share them with us.

Future of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear Proliferation

The topic can be addressed in the following three points

1. What is the nature of the crisis facing the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
2. What does this mean to the NPT and its related elements?
3. What are India’s options?

In terms of the nature of the crisis, there are two major crises. One is a kind of a quasi crisis. This is the crisis of what we know of as the A.Q Khan affair, the whole issue of nuclear commerce or nuclear smuggling and the supply of nuclear material from Pakistan and I would suggest that this is not a very serious crisis; this is unlikely to happen again. It had primarily happened because of the fact that there was a misperception about the direction of the nuclear proliferation that Pakistan was involved in. The assumption was that much of the weapons were going into Pakistan. The United States did not realize that a lot of it was also going out of Pakistan.

So there was a kind of misperception. For example, the North Korean link: there were analysts in Delhi who were writing about the possibility that just as Pakistan was getting missiles from North Korea, Pakistan was possibly also supplying something to the North Koreans. It is not that people didn’t realize it but that the reverse direction was not taken seriously enough. This could happen again if it suited the United States and the other major powers to look the other way, as has happened several times. So this is not a fundamental threat to the regime as such, this is a matter of policy and that of political convenience.

The two major types of challenges to the NPT regime are, one the breakout possibility, that the countries that do not have nuclear weapons and are members of the Non Proliferation Treaty, would become nuclear weapons states. This is concerned primarily with Iran and North Korea and also with India, Pakistan and Israel. If we look at the number of cases here, there are only four to five cases. In the 1960’s it was thought that by 1995 there would be 25 countries that would become nuclear powers. Clearly this has not happened. So the seriousness of this as a threat is over rated. Iran clearly violated its commitments, but Iran was caught in that twilight zone where if not caught it would have turned nuclear. Iran’s activities were detected before it could actually become a nuclear weapons state. So much of attention is focused on Iran right now that the possibility that Iran will be able to acquire sufficient amount of fissile material and actually manufacture nuclear weapons is rather remote. Iran’s possible option now would be to do what India and to some extent Pakistan did, which is to build up the civilian nuclear infrastructure slowly, over decades. But the non-proliferation regime has been getting tighter in terms of verification and inspection and so Iran’s capacity to go nuclear has been eliminated or is rather likely to be eliminated.

North Korea has successfully managed that twilight period and has actually managed to cross that point of becoming a nuclear power and if North Korean claim is to be believed they have already manufactured a couple of nuclear weapons. So North Korea represents the case of a successful proliferation while Iran represents a case of failed proliferation. North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have managed to build up nuclear capabilities sufficiently before being detected by the United States. The situation in North Korea is very difficult because it is no longer non-proliferation; the situation is now of rolling back the nuclear weapons capability and that is always much more difficult than preventing countries from going nuclear.

But what the Iranian case and the North Korean case demonstrate is that the bar has constantly moved upwards, as Prof. Zuberi already pointed out. The bar in terms of crossing the nuclear threshold, the difficulty level of a non-nuclear country wanting to go nuclear has consistently moved upwards from the time the non-proliferation treaty was signed. So for any new proliferant, the bar is so high that it will very likely be impossible to cross. So the crisis in terms of more countries becoming nuclear is unlikely. North Korea is likely to be the last successful proliferant.

But there is one group of countries, which could break out and become nuclear. These are the countries that are within the NPT and which have built up sufficient industrial capabilities, countries like Japan, Germany, Canada, Sweden, and Australia. For these countries, it is a political decision. For example, if Japan wants to go nuclear, it does not have to build up a nuclear industrial capability; they just have to take a political decision to go nuclear. They already have the delivery capability and the nuclear technological capability. The political decision until now has been not to go nuclear even though there has been a continuous underground debate within Japan about the possibility of going nuclear. So this is the first type of crisis, of countries within the NPT who have built up their civilian nuclear capability deciding to go nuclear.

The second type of crisis is that of United States changing its views about non-proliferation. Many international regimes and laws are primarily dependent on how the great powers behave and what their interests are. International regimes do not come up because the weak powers want them to come up; for example in 1970’s the NIEO, the New International Information Order etc., were all proposed by the third world countries but nothing happened. Whereas when you compare the fortunes of disarmament towards that of non-proliferation again nuclear disarmament primarily coming from the third world and from the non-nuclear states and the proliferation demand primarily from the developed and the powerful states, we can see that non-proliferation has had more success than disarmament. So the most important countries are the countries that are the most powerful and for the non-proliferation regime to be under serious threat would mean that the United States loses faith in the non-proliferation regime. This would mean serious trouble just as in the case of biological weapons convention, CTBT and nuclear disarmament.

But the US has too much at stake in the NPT and in any case all the arguments in Washington about how NPT has failed is only strengthening the regime because what it leads to is other countries fearing that United States will walk out and therefore conceding that the regime should be tightened. When we look at the history of the regime, it is a case of violations of the regime, which in turn made the regime stronger. The 1974 nuclear test conducted by India led to domestic non-proliferation legislation and Nuclear Suppliers Group. In 1980’s Pakistani proliferation led to several international non-proliferation norms; the 1991 Gulf War detected Iraqi violations and led to the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and some of the post 1998 events including detection of A.Q Khan’s role in proliferation led to a whole host of activities to strengthen the regime. PSI is one aspect of this. There was also a talk of preventing non-nuclear weapon states from getting the complete nuclear fuel cycles, the arguments being that a country that is not nuclear does not need a fuel cycle. So the implicit bargain in NPT about countries giving up military nuclear technology in exchange for civilian nuclear technology also faces a threat, in addition to the fact that the bargain over nuclear disarmament was already completely out of the treaty. The threat that the United States might walk out is itself leading to the strengthening of the regime.

What is the implication for the NPT regime? There are four main implications. One is that the NPT regime over all will become even stricter; PSI is one aspect of that strengthening of that regime. Over a period of time we can expect nuclear research, power generation and nuclear civilian transfers coming under threat. The second would be that the inspection regime would become much more stricter. The prospects for the third world countries going nuclear are around zero. Japan and other industrialized countries have the potential from this point onwards for going nuclear. Finally the NPT lobby will become stronger. It has already become stronger in Washington. This is bad news for India as well as for the regime because there will be more legislations and attempts outside the NPT structure to create quasi groups which would lead to further tightening of the regime.

The implications for India can be described again in four points. When the regime gets tighter, Indian and Pakistani position will become that much more harder and from the prospective of New Delhi in particular, we will continue to be clubbed with the Pakistanis, irrespective of the record of Pakistani proliferation. We will not get much out of proving that Indians are the good guys and Pakistanis the bad ones in terms of proliferation because as this regime gets tighter and tighter we are going to be clubbed more and more with the Pakistanis. Second, assuming that the Bush administration continues for another four years and taking in account its unilateral approach, there could be opportunities for a political deal in the United States, even though its possibilities are remote for various reasons. As it becomes more skeptical of the NPT’s usefulness and as the non-proliferation fundamentalists in Washington become stronger, the possibility of a political deal becomes that much less likely. In the last couple of years India-US dialogue has stagnated because of the fact that the non-proliferation fundamentalists in Washington have become stronger. There has been a debate in Washington between the State department and the Defense department a variety of issues like the sale of Israeli Arabs missiles to India, conclusion of agreements on other nuclear technologies, trinity issues etc. The State department has always been much less willing to agree on concessions to India.

The third point is the possibility for India to have a kind of strategic proliferation policy, which is also remote. Several countries have practiced strategic proliferation. The United States and France helped or looked the other way when Israel was becoming a nuclear power and China actively helped Pakistan become a nuclear power. There have been post-cold war debates in Washington about the possibility of other strategic proliferation of countries such as Japan, Germany and Ukraine becoming nuclear powers. The debates have been on the issue of whether it is good for the United States or bad for the United States. India has never had such debates; we have always been more anti proliferationist than even the non-proliferation fundamentalists.

Finally some of the stricter measures and restrictions will have an effect on India directly. None of the discussions with United States about the Trinity issues and the NSSP (Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership) are taking a firm shape. There is opposition from the US State department on any concessions to India even on the issue of third countries like France or Russia supplying nuclear power plants to India. Nuclear power plants are something India is eagerly looking forward to. So the problem is that we have never had a debate about whether proliferation is good for India or not. This rules out the possibility of a compromise that could lead to a negotiation with the United States.

Legal Dimensions of Implementing PSI

The concept of PSI struck me even as it came through the news in September 2003. This is not the first time something like PSI was being used against countries like North Korea. BBC news online 5th September 2003 reported that in December 2002, Spain intercepted a North Korean ship carrying scud missiles and handed over the vessel to United States. We are now faced with the process of ‘formalizing’ PSI as an alliance system. It is, however, instructive to look at the context in which the new alliance system takes shape. A US handout says that the target entities of the PSI system are of two categories – countries like North Korea and ‘non-state entities’, i. e. some select ‘terrorist’ groups.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE

The United Nations has been grappling at least at the normative level with the problem of ‘elimination’ of international terrorism. By now there are some 12 international treaties and 7 regional conventions. Since 1992, the problem came to be increasingly focused and started repeatedly appearing on the agenda of the Security Council. Since then the great powers were given the opportunity to use the Security Council for conceptualizing and seeking to implement a sort of PSI, at least against the terrorist groups. The result, of course, was the resolution, Prof. Zuberi referred to in his presentation, Resolution 1540 of 2004 adopted on 28th April 2004. I have no difficulty in reading this resolution as terrorism-specific, as it is formulated as one of the Council responses to international terrorism. Normally resolutions of international bodies do not contain footnotes but this resolution has footnotes. There is a star footnote on the first page, which says “definitions for the purpose of this resolution only.” These are definitions of three terms, namely, “means of delivery,” “non-state actor” (“individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution”), and “related material.” Prof Zuberi was pondering aloud over the meaning of “related material:” the definition is found in the resolution. Although not too specific, the definition is adequate for the purposes of understanding the rationale behind the resolution.

The context should also include the issue of disarmament. By the 1954, it was insisted by Jawaharlal Nehru at his UN General Assembly annual interventions that the issues of disarmament should be dealt with multilaterally not unilaterally, as not only the great powers, but all members of the international community had seminal interest in pursuing the goal of disarmament. But now things are being dealt with through ‘collective unilateralism:’ it begins with one individual State, usually a great power, then eventually in order to seek legitimacy it becomes collective unilateralism.

I would present three points on PSI from a legal perspective:

1. Unilateralism.
2. Use of force under the UN Charter.
3. Law of the Sea.

On unilateral actions there is a general rule, as formulated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case in 1951. The Court ruled that while a State has considerable freedom of action, when a conduct of State has international implications, the legality of that conduct should be subject to determination by International Law. In other words, the burden is on the state concerned to justify its action in terms of legitimacy and acceptability under International Law. I would therefore look at unilateral acts of states from this perspective.

What we have here is what I would call as ‘collective unilaterlism’ to force selective disarmament. The trend began with the London Club in 1975, then MTCR in 1987, then Australia club in 1992, Wassenaar Club in 1995, and now The Hague Group of 2002. Particularly the last two have all brought about restrictions and embargoes in free international transfers of what these clubs deem to be dual use technologies. The problem with these clubs is that they are very loose clubs, they don’t even have Articles of Association (let alone any treaty basis), except for certain generally agreed guidelines and these guidelines get broadened over and over again, at the instance of a great power. If these guidelines are implemented by national legislation by a ‘participant’ country, by even extending their import to transactions between and in non-participating countries, the result of that kind of implementation is felt to the detriment of these countries. We in India have been familiar with such arbitrary extraterritorial application of national laws by the US. In the 1992-93 cryogenic engine controversy Russia was arm-twisted to back out of the technology transfer obligations under the erstwhile Indo-Russian Cryogenic Engine Technology Agreement even as both India and Russia (at that time) were not parties to MTCR. Washington put the heat on Moscow and Moscow backed out of the agreement giving India five additional cryogenic engines in return for the abrogation/renegotiation of the agreement. So such ‘collective unilateral’ arrangements as MTCR would give lead to acts of dubious legality.

Prof. Zuberi highlighted discrimination in the realm of disarmament. Why is it that the P5 can legitimately acquire and hold nuclear weapons and others cannot. If others do it, it is illegal, in terms of the NPT. But when the P5 hold and vertically multiply nuclear weapons there is nothing wrong with it. The non-P5 should not also transfer nuclear weapons or their technology. Do we have any international peremptory norm prohibiting development or transfer of nuclear weapons or any other weapons only with respect to certain countries and not to others. Or is the privilege of the P5 to determine this? Peremptory norms can only be non-discriminatory – except on ground of equity. We cannot have a selective, discriminatory international framework of norms and institutional mechanism that would treat a small group of states privileged in view of their superior military power. Any international disarmament monitoring or enforcing mechanism, by its very definition, must have authority over all states without any discrimination. I would assess the validity and legitimacy of PSI from that angle. PSI tries to cater for the interests of a few countries, primarily some of the great powers. Could we seek answers to global issues of disarmament in this way? This is a question to ponder over.

The second aspect is use of force. The law relating to use of force is of course very clear although this is the very law which is being violated repeatedly. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter clearly says: ” All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” There are two kinds of situations in which use of force is permissible: one, organizational action by the Security Council, and the other Article 51 right of self-defence. The Council now authorizes PSI. Does PSI fall within the right of self-defence? The answer would be No because you need an armed attack to invoke the right of self-defense. Security Council resolution 1540 is terrorism-specific. It is non-state actor specific. The PSI allows some states to act outside the UN Charter framework of control of force and yet insists legitimacy.

The third aspect is the Law of the Sea. There are two critical areas in this regard, one is the law relating to the territorial sea and the other, that of the high seas. The way in which the provisions on territorial waters came to be adopted in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has had a long history. Earlier the complaint of the countries of blue water navies was that the coastal states could at a moment’s notice declare any passage as non-innocent and that there were no objective criteria particularly in Article 16 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea of 1958 (which dealt with the passage through straits). The issue was quite extensively debated. In order to eliminate the chances of subjective application of the concept of innocent passage by the coastal states, the UN Convention of 1982 came up with objective criteria, yet protecting the coastal state rights to tackle any problems of security, and law and order. Let the coastal state handle these problems in its own way within the framework of 1982 Convention. Why PSI? Or would PSI give a handle to a foreign state to enter into a coastal state’s territorial waters and apply PSI principles even without consulting the latter.

With the regime of the High Seas, the ruling principle has been freedom of the high seas. There was a time, not long ago, when the freedom of the high seas was interpreted by the United States, as implying a right for it not to affirm or deny that its ships carried nuclear weapons: this was about 10 or 15 years ago, and precisely for this reason United States was quite unwilling to be a party to protocols of many of the regional nuclear free zone treaties. PSI represents an about-turn. I don’t declare whether my ships carry nuclear weapons or not but you better come clean on it. If you don’t, I step on you on suspicion that you carry nuclear weapons. One finds this to a highly arbitrary use of the freedom of the high seas principle. An equally lofty principle of the High Seas is that each state must respect the rights of the others. Each shall exercise its rights with due regard to the rights of others.

For all these reasons PSI is of highly doubtful legality.

Security Dimensions of Peninsular India

Security Dimensions

A two-day seminar on “Security Dimensions of Peninsular India” was organised by the Centre for Security Analysis on 22 and 23 March 2004. The Seminar reinforced the importance of a southern Indian perspective to security issues confronting India. It also brought into focus the need for a comprehensive approach to security. The major themes of the seminar were traditional threats to security, non-traditional threats, technological threats, ecology, water security and media perspectives. Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan (Retd.), President of CSA, while welcoming the Chief Guest and others said that the concept of security was changing and goes beyond traditional military dimensions. Non-traditional forms of security such as societal, political and environmental security were equally important.

Keynote Address

His Excellency, the Governor of Tamil Nadu, Shri. P.S. Ramamohan Rao delivered the keynote address at the inaugural session on 22 March. In his address, the Governor emphasised the need for a comprehensive and holistic view of security. Threats to Indian security generally arise from both the external and internal factors. He also stressed on the importance of the sources of these threats and the tools they employ to destabilise and create trouble in the country.

From the point of view of external dimensions of security, the emergence of Peninsular India as a source of hydrocarbons has great security implications. Of related importance is the inland pipelines needed to transport the oil and gas produced in the Peninsular region. With India’s increasing share in world trade, the location of sea-lanes that connect the west and the east just south of India are also of strategic concern. Further, most of the space and nuclear installations are located in Peninsular India. Apart from the traditional hostility with Pakistan and to a lesser degree with Bangladesh, relations with Sri Lanka are also of concern because of the hazy maritime boundary and the occurrence of at least a couple of incidents almost routinely every month. The Sri Lankan minorities problem is also of concern.

On the internal dimensions of security, he said that all internal threats arise out of impact of internal dissonance on security. Among these he mentioned Naxalism, river water disputes, social and caste alienations, religious conversions, poverty, uneven regional development, and corruption. He said that Naxalism is an ideology that believes in ‘waging war’ to replace the existing state with a state of its ideological moorings. Many tend to misunderstand it and assume that the problem arises because of socio-economic problems. Socio-economic problems are only issues that Naxalism exploits. He said that all these internal problems have the potential to create tensions in society and affect national security.

As regards the sources of insecurity, he listed some of the major sources of insecurity. A major source is the ISI that has links with various organisations in the country as also with the LTTE. The expatriate Indians working in the Middle East and the Indian mafia that has taken shelter there are also a source of insecurity. Some of the other important sources are refugees, internal sabotage through ideological subversion and indoctrination, nuclear missile attacks on the nuclear and space installations in Peninsular India, and cyber terrorism against India’s critical establishments.

Special Address

The Vice Chancellor of the University of Madras, Prof. S.P. Thyagarajan, gave a special address on Bio terrorism. He said that bio terrorism was not new phenomenon and had been practised from ancient times. The modern bio weapons programme was initiated by the United States in 1942 and the USSR soon followed suit. They developed smallpox virus, ebola virus and toxins of bacteria – botulinum and tetanus, etc. These could be delivered through aerosol sprays, aircraft and missiles. Terming bio weapons as the poor man’s atom bomb, he said that the significance of bio weapons lies in the fact that they are highly infectious and highly resistant to antibiotics. To tackle this threat it is essential to create awareness among the people and develop knowledge of reliable diagnostics. He also said that environmental monitoring by agencies would be a step in the right direction.

Internal Security Threats

One of the major points that emerged with respect to internal security was that in recent years violence had been steadily rising. Mr. M.K. Narayanan, Vice President of CSA, observed that Naxals in Andhra Pradesh and adjoining areas of Chattisgarh, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh were displaying high levels of sophistication. They displayed military precision, familiarity with explosives and triggering devices, and transnational linkages. There was also evidence of subversion on a significant scale, and the presence of ISI modules had been detected in the region. Between twenty to thirty percent – of the more than 200 ISI modules detected and incapacitated – were in the south. Mr. S. Subramaniam, Chairman of the Association for Advancement of Police and Security Sciences, Hyderabad, felt that there is need for a special force to tackle internal threats, as the police are not adequately trained to deal with such threats.

Maritime Security

The Seminar also focussed on the emerging importance of the Indian Ocean both from the economic as well as from the strategic point of view. Dr. Sanjay Chaturvedi of the Punjab University, in a lucid presentation argued that Peninsular India would remain closely tied to both continuity and change in the triangular interplay among geo political, economic and strategic forces in the Indian Ocean. The importance of the region stems from the importance of securing energy supplies and sea lanes of communication. Andaman and Nicobar Islands, located close to the straits of Malacca, are strategically important. Cmde. R.S. Vasan who chaired the session stressed on the importance of ports and the need for our ports to be capable of screening containers.

Dr. Adluri Subramanyam Raju addressed the issue of India’s maritime security in the Palk Bay straits. He dwelt on the fishermen problem between India and Sri Lanka. Tracing the historical roots of the problem, he analysed the details of the 1974 and 1976 agreements between India and Sri Lanka by which India recognised the sovereignty of Sri Lanka over the contentious island of Katchathivu, the area around which is the main catchment area of fishes. He concluded by saying that one of the ways by which the problem could be resolved was by leasing the island of Katchathivu in perpetuity, on the lines of the Tin Bigha arrangement with Bangladesh.

Technological Threats

With increasing technological threats to security and little understanding of its intricacies, the seminar was a revelation on how to deal with such threats. It was both informative and educative. Mr. S. Ram Mohan said that for information war the battleground is information infrastructure, financial systems, strategic systems, etc. The interconnectivity between them makes it more vulnerable. A major aspect of technological terrorism that was dealt with was cyber terrorism. The paper by Dr. Rama Subramaniam, Co-chairman of the Forum for Global Standards of Information Security, drew attention to the challenges that security professionals face today, given today’s technology and cost structure in creating and implementing an infraction-proof security architecture. According to Dr. Aniruddha Joshi of the Pune University, major initiatives in the Indian context are capacity building for handling information and network security, use of indigenous tools, risk analysis and regular audits, policies to handle cyber attacks and international cooperation. It also emerged from the seminar that by and large nuclear installations in our country are safe. The technical and security safeguards against radiological emissions effectively take care of today’s concerns of physical attack on nuclear installations. They are less vulnerable to 9/11 types of attacks. The point was underlined by Dr. S. Rajagopal of the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore.

Non Traditional Security

Regarding framework for non-traditional security, Prof. T.K. Oomen laid down five units for analysis, viz., economic disparity, patriarchy, heterogeneity, externality and hierarchy. In the context of secessionism, Dr. Swarna Rajagopal, an independent analyst based in Chennai, highlighted the Dravida Nadu experience. Dr. M.J. Vinod from Bangalore University, analysed the problem of internally displaced people in the context of armed conflicts. Another issue addressed by the seminar was environmental and water security.

The importance and significance of national water grid was underscored in the seminar. Mr. S. Kalyanaraman, who chaired the session, gave a detailed exposition of the importance of glacial source of water and how it could be tapped and utilised through a national water grid. Dr. Amit Dholakia from MS University, Baroda, brought out the problems and conflicts that arise while planning the construction of dams, and in water management. He also suggested ways of tackling such conflicts. The extent of pollution due to industrialisation and the inefficiency of the system was graphically portrayed by Dr. M.B. Pavithra and Dr. Thilak Raj of the University of Madras, through the case of tanneries’ pollution in Tamil Nadu.

A significant theme of importance that came up in the seminar was media perspective and the issue of security. Dr. B.P. Sanjay, Director of the Indian Institute of Mass Communication (IIMC), said that the relationship of media to security issues and concerns are manifold and not necessarily restricted to or limited to conventional security dimensions as is often understood.

The seminar brought into focus many issues which had not hitherto been given due importance. The significance of the seminar lies in its success in projecting the comprehensive nature of security and the need for a Peninsular perspective, which has its own unique dimensions and import.

Prof. Gopalji Malviya, Head of the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Madras and one of the founding members of CSA was the Seminar Director and ably organised and conducted the seminar. He also very crisply summed up the seminar proceedings and proposed the vote of thanks.

Public Perceptions of Security in India

The term “Security” has traditionally been perceived and understood from a military perspective and even more so from that of the state. There is however a growing awareness of the need to view other and non-traditional dimensions of security which affect the lives of the citizen. The concept of Human Security which encompasses the well being of the citizen has been accepted as more relevant to the present times. As a consequence, Human Development indices are now the primary barometers of human security. Security is a matrix of components which add up to the comprehensive security of both the state and citizen. These security components include external and internal threats besides economic, environmental, societal and political threats. These combine to place the citizen’s focus on freedom from fear, danger and threats.

The Indian citizens’ perceptions on the totality of security available to them provide an insight into the new and wider ideas of security. In order to assess the citizens’ perceptions of security, Centre for Security Analysis (CSA), Chennai commissioned a study in 2003 to understand and interpret the common man’s perception on various dimensions of security threats. In addition to macro level security threats from external and internal sources, the micro aspects of security included dimensions such as environmental security, political security, societal security, personal & physical security, and economic security. The sample for the study had 2024 respondents drawn from four metros and nine mini metros across four geographic zones and were further categorized by gender (two categories), income levels (four categories), and socio-economic classifications (four categories). The initial data collected from the respondents were subjected to detailed statistical analysis and interpretations which are expected to aid policy makers in framing effective responses to these perceived threats. While M/S AC Nielsen designed the sampling methodology and collected the data from the field, the questionnaire for the survey was prepared in consultation with the Centre for Security Analysis.

Traditional Security Threats

The responses indicated that the threats from External and Internal Security factors were ranked the highest. These two factors were also seen to be highly co-related indicating that the two were interdependent. A high risk perception on one of these security aspects would consequently lead to high risk perception on the other. The respondents in the northern region viewed the threat of external threat to be highest.

External and Internal Security

Since the external and internal security threats were highly correlated the respondents of the northern region viewed the latter also as the maximum. This was followed by the respondents’ in the Western region. The eastern and southern regions appeared to perceive internal threats slightly lower in comparison. The possible reason could be higher exposure to bomb blasts and terrorist insurgency activities in the northern region as compared to the southern part of the country.

Non-Traditional Threats

The trends indicated by the micro level factors were slightly different compared to the macro level factors. Among the four zones, the perception of the respondents from northern and eastern region on Personal Physical Security Threat was very high as compared to the respondents from south and the west. This was primarily ascribed to fear of theft and robbery, as well as media reports of murders and assaults. The responses from northern region on this count have a high co-relation with their responses to external and internal threats.

Majority of the respondents (75%) appeared to feel highly insecure or somewhat insecure with regard to the present state of Environmental Security. The threat perception in northern region was higher than the other three regions where the views were more or less similar. The Economic Security perception was dominated by the eastern region followed by northern region. The western and southern regions found this as a lesser threat.

On the other hand the Societal and Political Security observed a diametrically opposite trend as compared to the other micro factors. About 60% of respondents claimed to feel highly secure or somewhat secure in the present day society. Out of this, a majority of respondents were from the northern region, while eastern region appeared to feel more insecure in comparison. In case of Political Security, a small proportion (25%) of the total respondents appeared to be concerned about the political scenario in the country in terms of perceiving it as a security threat. By and large, respondents did not perceive any serious threat to their political security.

Overall Security Perceptions

The overall analysis of results indicates that there is less uniformity in the perceptions of people from different regions, different income levels, and socio-economic classification (SEC) levels on external and internal security threats. This lack of uniformity in perceptions is also seen in other facets of micro level issues relating to economic, personal & physical, and environmental security. It is also evident that the perceptions of external security threats appeared to be driving or influencing perceptions relating to environmental, physical or economic security dimensions in different regions. The highest uniformity in perception was indicated for political and societal security dimensions. In fact, they were negatively correlated to external, internal, economic and environmental threats.

New Insights

Some interesting facets also emerged on the security perceptions. The first concerned the Gender Dimension. In every area of security, male and female response showed a similarity in responses. In other words, on issues of security, both genders of the population respond together and in similar fashion. The second insight concerned the security perceptions at different Income Levels. An interesting factor observed among different income levels is that respondents in the lowest income category did not perceive any of these risks as very high. However the respondents in the two mid income categories who numerically dominate the overall sample size view things slightly different but generally agreeing with the overall view. It is evident that the lowest income group is more concerned about their day to day basic needs than giving much of importance to various security threats and treats such threats as an inevitable part of their existence. The third interesting dimension is the high threat perception in northern and eastern zones of the country. South and western zones of the country view themselves as better off in security terms. These perspectives are due to reasons of physical dangers, economic growth pattern, quality of governance and societal cum political stability. The fourth interesting fact is the uniform view across the country that Political Security – the freedom to pursue political beliefs is of a high order. It is a reaffirmation of India’s success as a democratic and secular nation.

Value of the Study

This is the first analysis in India specifically on public perceptions of security. This study was commenced towards the end of 2003 and procedural factors have enabled its publication in 2005. The General Elections of 2004 and its results showed the relationship between perceptions of security and political choices made by the citizens. That a state can be seemingly secure in military, economic and political terms, even as its citizens consider themselves insecure in different ways, gets reflected in the arena of political economy. That the security of the state and the security of its citizens are inseparable has been confirmed by this analysis. It indicates that neglecting either would be unacceptable. The neglect of non-traditional dimensions of security can be politically costly to ruling establishments. The citizens allocate a considerable weight to issues of security in economic, environmental, societal and political terms. A better understanding of public perceptions on the wider meaning of security will assist in effective policy planning, development programmes and monitoring of their outcomes.

AIDS and Comfort

Meenakshi Datta Ghosh assumed charge as additional secretary and project director of the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) in June 2002. In an interview to Jaya Shreedhar , she says it’s important to dispel the ignorance about AIDS in India:

In India, people living with HIV are often ostracised by their communities or dragged to court despite the government’s policy to “uphold (their) rights and dignity.” How do you propose to deal with such issues?

living with HIVIgnorance and fear lies at the root of discrimination and stigma. It is necessary to cultivate a scientific temper and help people comprehend the medical reality of AIDS. The time has come to articulate a paradigm shift in our perception of AIDS. HIV and AIDS are simply chronic manageable conditions that need acceptance, care, support and compassion like all chronic diseases. For, if HIV and AIDS do not kill, the stigma, discrimination, exclusion and isolation will.

Several years may pass before a person living with HIV falls ill. Until then, people living with HIV can lead a relatively normal, productive life by taking good care of their health through regular medical reviews and antiretroviral therapy if necessary, and taking care not to donate blood, share needles or indulge in sex without condoms. HIV is not transmitted via skin-to-skin contact and there is no reason to isolate someone living with HIV due to fear of casual contagion. The unfortunate tendency to keep linking HIV transmission to unlawful or ‘amoral’ activities has resulted in the general population mentally distancing themselves as being beyond the reach of the virus.

Changing popular perceptions about AIDS requires massive inputs of information, education and communication, sensitisation of opinion makers and political leaders at all levels, and maybe some modification in legislation. NACO has made a beginning. These efforts need to be given more momentum.

Nearly two million children in Asia have lost one or both parents to AIDS. But India reportedly refused to furnish its count of AIDS orphans because it felt “too uncomfortable.”

This is where a second paradigm shift is necessary. We need to educate the community not to forsake the responsibility of caring for children because their parents perished in an epidemic. I strongly believe the joint family system will continue the tradition of caring for orphans in the family.

There is also need for an effective mechanism to estimate the number of AIDS orphans. However, the survival of the parents is equally important. We are, therefore, working towards a combination of institutional and home-based care initiatives to ensure the long-term survival of both mother and child. As India has about 27-28 million deliveries a year, mother-to-child HIV prevention is critical.

The long-term survival of people living with HIV is dependent on anti-retroviral therapy. But the majority of patients find patented drugs and even generics unaffordable…

Ironically, though India is among the largest producers and exporters of low-cost generic drugs, they are not affordable within the country. We need to deliberate with representatives from the pharma industry, donor agencies and health service providers. A rational policy of standard treatment regimens for HIV and AIDS needs to be adopted. Such a policy should detail modalities for expanding access to these regimens and consider social marketing and franchising to enhance the availability of HIV-related products and services. We should not fail to link HIV prevention with care and support.

Sceptics say NACO’s data on HIV/AIDS in India is neither comprehensive nor reliable.

NACO gathers data on the extent of the HIV/AIDS epidemic from its annual National Sentinel Surveillance survey and the Behavioural Sentinel survey (2001). We have also put in place a computerised management information service this year. The National Sentinel Surveillance survey (2002) will survey some 384 sites, which include sexually transmitted disease clinics, antenatal clinics, intravenous drug-user sites, and homosexual sites. I am working towards increasing the number of sites, to refine moda-lities for estimation with a view to en- hancing coverage and accuracy.

What is your assessment of NACO’s performance. How do you plan to shape its agenda?

NACO has several effective intervention programmes. The most successful ones need to be scaled up and replicated. We have evolved a comprehensive package of services for vulnerable segments and are refining strategies for HIV prevention. We are also working on providing support and care for people living with HIV and AIDS.

We intend to focus on identifying gaps in the existing strategies with regard to the geographical heterogeneity of the spread of the epidemic. We are working towards upgrading community-level HIV surveillance. We will work towards professionalising health delivery systems that deal with the logistics, management and delivery of safe blood. The specifications and standards for drugs, instruments, equipment and accessories that are utilised in the national AIDS programme need to be better arti- culated. All this can only be accomplished through multi-sectoral cooperation, community awareness and participation, initiatives from private and non-governmental sectors and explicit political will and commitment.