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The Stability-Instability Paradox: South Asia and the Nuclear Future
Introduction
Dr. Michael Krepon, founder-president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, an
independent Washington think-tank on security issues, visited the Centre
for Security Analysis on the 16th of October, 2003. He participated in a
round-table discussion on "The Nuclear Future" and gave a talk that was
open to the public on "The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia."
The following brief is based on these talks and the ensuing discussions.
Is it possible to predict the behaviour of nuclear states, and what does the future hold for them? These were the questions that animated Dr. Krepon's talks and he used a theoretical point of departure to orient his response: deterrence theory's "stability-instability" paradox.
What is the
"Stability-Instability Paradox"?
Nuclear weapons create both instability and stability in an adversarial
relationship between two nuclear-armed states.
Knowledge of the physical consequences of nuclear weapons use serves as
a deterrent that prompts states to ensure that that threshold is not
crossed. This creates a certain stability in the relationship between
two nuclear states.
Paradoxically, this stability destabilizes the relationship. Conviction
that conflict with the other state cannot cross the nuclear threshold
provides licence for rising tensions and unlimited coercive action short
of that threshold.
How does this theory apply
to the India-Pakistan nuclear equation?
Like many other theoretical constructions, the "Stability-Instability
Paradox" is a product of the study of Cold War politics. Nuclear weapons
have created both stability and instability in South Asia, going by the
views of those Dr. Krepon describes as "deterrence optimists" and
"deterrence pessimists."
Deterrence optimists see a stable equation emerging as a result of both
India and Pakistan becoming nuclear weapon states. Their optimism,
according to Dr. Krepon, rests on three powerful premises. First, the
nuclear threshold has not been breached in past crises between the two
countries. Leaders on both sides are aware of the consequences of a
nuclear war, and have been very responsible. Secondly, the national
economic agenda, particularly in growth-oriented India, militates
against a nuclear war on either side. Third, a nuclear crisis will
surely be met by third party-namely, United States-intervention.
Deterrence pessimists identify the ways in which the instability part of
the paradox is in place in India-Pakistan relations. Dr. Krepon listed
conditions that exacerbate this. First, growing conventional imbalance
exacerbates nuclear instability. The conventional military balance is
tipping in India's favour. India's purchasing power and procurement
options are better than those of Pakistan, whose reliance on China is
increasing. Secondly, miscalculations result when the two sides don't
know each other's capabilities and in the absence of mutual inspections.
These miscalculations are likely to trigger a nuclear crisis. Third,
this extends to India and Pakistan's ability to read each other's
postures. While the two countries are able to interpret conventional
moves, they have little understanding of each other's nuclear postures
and moves. This can have critical, even catastrophic, consequences.
Fourth, as nuclear parity is lost in the long run and the nuclear
balance too tips in India's favour, instability in the non-nuclear
sphere could spread to the nuclear sphere as well. Fifth, the nuclear
threshold is ambiguous and hard to pinpoint, and any of the above
factors could trigger nuclear escalation to a point past that threshold.
Finally, Dr. Krepon spoke of two vulnerabilities that contribute to
instability. While they were attributed to the early stages of the
nuclear programmes, both seem to be a function of the differences in
strategic depth between two states. The first vulnerability rests in the
adversary's knowledge of where the other side's nuclear assets and
delivery systems are located. Pakistan is more susceptible than India on
this count and less likely, therefore, to give credence to a 'no first
use' doctrine on India's part. The second vulnerability is to an attack
aimed at destroying a state's top leadership. In its turn, India is more
vulnerable to this possibility as its strategic depth places many
targets outside Pakistan's reach.
On balance, although elements of both stability and instability are
present in the relationship between India and Pakistan, it is
instability that is the dominant element.
How might we alter the
balance in favour of a stable India-Pakistan nuclear relationship?
Dr. Krepon cited 10 key elements from the Western experience.
1. Do not change or try to change the territorial status quo in
sensitive areas by the use of force or intimidation.
2. Avoid nuclear boasting.
3. Avoid dangerous military practices.
4. Put in place special reinforcing measures for nuclear weapons such as
their movement, operations, etc.
5. Negotiate and implement nuclear risk reduction measures and
confidence building measures (CBMs).
6. Agree on verification arrangements and intensive monitoring. This is
because one cannot trust the other's rhetoric and proof will be
required.
7. Establish reliable means of communication between political leaders
and military leaders of both sides. Talk to each other all the time
through regular summits, etc.
8. Establish reliable command and control as well as superior
intelligence capabilities.
9. Keep working hard on all these measures and keep improving.
10. Hope for good luck, because even if one works hard on other points,
things could go wrong.
What next?
Describing "the nuclear future" as wide open, Dr. Krepon outlined four
alternatives.
I. The abolition of all nuclear weapons.
While this was and is the goal reaffirmed by many states and
international regimes, it is very hard for nuclear weapon states to give
up these symbols of national power and prestige. Further, deterrence
calculations dominate security planning, including nuclear
decision-making. Dr. Krepon therefore pronounced this nuclear future
"very unlikely to happen."
II. Nuclear anarchy.
Fears of an unregulated proliferation of nuclear weapons gave impetus to
the creation and promotion of a global non-proliferation regime. These
fears have both been borne out and proven exaggerated over ensuing
decades. By the forging of regional and global regimes that regulate
their production, acquisition and use, and through the unilateral
adoption, tacitly or explicitly, of non-use policies, nuclear weapons
have not been used since 1945, no matter what the intensity of a given
conflict between nuclear weapon states.
On the other hand, this is a standard of non-use that is easily broken.
Further, both radioactive materials and weapons design can be accessed
and need to be better guarded. In the hands of terrorists, they could be
used to create panic. The questions of preserving these weapons from
terrorists as also using them against terrorists, do not figure in the
current security thinking. In Dr. Krepon's words, thus, "nuclear anarchy
is unlikely but it is worth worrying about."
III. Safe or stabilizing proliferation.
Dr. Krepon dismissed this as an implausible version of the future.
IV. Unsafe proliferation.
Every new nuclear weapon state creates new security dilemmas in the wake
of its nuclearization. Dr. Krepon considered such a scenario "a real
possibility."
While Dr. Krepon's presentations shied away from assigning blame in the India-Pakistan context, discussion participants on both occasions were focused on explanations for India's policy choices.
Compiled by Dr. Swarna Rajagopalan