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Proliferation Security Initiative
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Session I - PSI as a
Concept
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Session II - Legal Dimensions and Future of Nuclear
Proliferation
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Session III
- ISPS and Container Security
PSI as a Concept
Dr.Richard Haynes
US Consul General,Chennai
Vice Admiral S.V. Gopalachari, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, discussed the vulnerability of the open registry or "flag of convenience" system for ship registry to exploitation by terrorists for smuggling in his keynote address to an earlier University of Madras seminar titled, Challenges to South Asian Peace and Security: Emerging Trends. The Admiral's remarks revealed yet another area where American and Indian interests coincide. Gopalachari remarked that over 60,000 ships transit the "New Silk Route" through the Indian Ocean each year. We realize South India straddles the New Silk Route and that Chennai serves as the South's primary port. Finally, we expect increased trade between the US and South India. So, together we should explore options to protect this region's vital commerce from exploitation by proliferators.
PSI Overview
"Even if you have the world's biggest hammer, not every problem is a nail," EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten reminded us when he spoke at the University of Madras on 27 November 2003. He was correct. Indeed, the best way to avoid the use of "hammers" is to act swiftly, when a problem first appears, with appropriate tools. America's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aims to do exactly that.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, require new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to
· Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or a non-state actor of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through:
i. Efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or
ii. Transfers (selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.
· Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
· Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.
· Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
i. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non- state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
· At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
· To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
· To take appropriate actions to:
i. Stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and
ii. To enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
· At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to
i. Require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or
ii. Deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes
transit rights
through their airspace in advance of such flights.
· If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified
A South Asian Example of PSI in Action
Please allow me to share a "real life" example of PSI in action familiar to those who follow South Asian politics. As you know, A.Q. Khan was regarded as the architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. What many did not know, until recently, was that he had also constructed an elaborate international network that spanned Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere, to proliferate nuclear technology to a number of outlaw regimes, including Iran and North Korea.
Over recent years, the United States and several other governments have worked closely to unravel the Khan network. Today, Khan has been stopped. His criminal enterprise is out of business. And at least one key supply line for civilization's most determined enemies has been closed.
Conclusion
In closing, let me underscore that the PSI does not threaten legitimate commerce or exchange. It is not an intrusion, but rather vigilance. It calls for the consent and cooperation of responsible sovereign powers to rob would-be smugglers of cover and concealment in their efforts to proliferate WMD.
PSI Pros and Cons
Prof. Matin Zuberi
Expert on Nuclear Arms Control Issues
The non-proliferation regime at present consists of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and the verification system established
under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The attempt to set up a
verification system under the Biological Weapons Convention recently
ended in failure. The comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation regime
has been in operation for a few decades.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is an inter-locking network of
international treaties, domestic legislations, bilateral regional
and multilateral verification systems called nuclear safeguards,
positive and negative security assurances to non nuclear weapons
states, economic sanctions, technology controls, nuclear weapon free
zones and informal groupings of states for specific purposes, and
its main focus is the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The NPT was completed in 1968 and came into force in 1970. It was
understood at that time that whatever was not prohibited was
allowed. The American chief negotiator of the NPT, William Foster,
listed activities that were not prohibited and he said "neither
uranium enrichment nor stockpiling of fissile material for peaceful
purposes under safeguards would violate Article 2 of the Treaty." He
also said "clearly permitted would be the development, under
safeguards, of plutonium fuelled power reactors including research
on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article 2
interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors and
resume cars." It should be noted that all these are the most
proliferation-prone activities and the regime has moved to ban these
activities because of their dangerous potential.
Another interesting aspect is how important and major industrial
countries subscribed to the regime. At the time of ratification of
the NPT, certain countries entered their reservations and these
became part of the legislative record of the Treaty itself. Let me
mention two or three countries in this context. The West German
government, while ratifying the Treaty, made public its
reservations. It contented that no nuclear activity in the fields of
research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes was
prohibited nor could transfer of information, material and equipment
be denied to non- nuclear-weapon states merely on the basis of
allegations. The Japanese government issued a long list of
reservations at the time of accession. These were about the long
duration of the treaty as well as the possible adverse impact of
safeguards on Japan's energy economy. Japan kept in mind the
possibility of withdrawal from the Treaty. A safeguards agreement
with the IAEA was concluded six years after accession to it and the
Japanese had very serious objections about IAEA's inspectors
entering into their nuclear power plants at odd hours. The Japanese
government asserted that the NPT did not explicitly prohibit
weapons-oriented research and development short of production of
nuclear weapons. Australia even maintained that no nuclear
development should be prohibited except when such activities would
have no purpose other than the manufacture of nuclear explosive
devices.
These reservations ensured that the industrialized countries'
capability to manufacture nuclear weapons would not be impeded by
treaty stipulations. Then the process of informal groupings started.
First there was the Zangger Committee which enlisted export items
that could trigger safeguards. In the 1970's an informal grouping of
states first met in London and was later called the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. Its guidelines went far beyond the trigger list,
which had gone beyond the NPT. Nuclear revisionism started and the
United States Congress passed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
according to which for the first time full-scope safeguards became a
precondition for the supply of nuclear technology to
non-nuclear-weapon states. The industrialized allies of the United
States were upset by the sudden change in U.S. nuclear policy. A
Japanese diplomat told his American counterpart, "For twenty years
we have followed US guidelines on nuclear policy. Now you are saying
you made a complete mistake, but it is too late". Once a policy with
long-term implications had been embarked upon it could not be
shifted to another gear to suit American preferences.
In this process the definition of proliferation has been
continuously changing, and consequently, the objectives of
safeguards have also been changing. By the late 1970's the
definition of proliferation changed from the manufacture or
acquisition of nuclear weapons to 'developing nuclear explosive
capability.' What is a nuclear explosive capability? If a country
has mastered the complete nuclear fuel cycle, it has certainly
developed a nuclear explosive capability. But according to William
Foster as quoted earlier, a complete nuclear fuel cycle including
breeder reactors was allowed by the NPT. According to an American
architect of the NPT, the safeguards system was never intended to be
a system for prevention of diversion. The safeguards were intended
to detect diversion from military to peaceful purposes but not to
prevent it. If an IAEA inspector saw someone walking out of plant
with nuclear material, he would not have the slightest authority to
stop it. The occurrence could only be reported to the IAEA that
would then the have to report to the U.N. Security Council. The NPT
divided member states into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states; but later a new layer of discrimination was added.
Industrialized countries could have a complete nuclear fuel cycle,
including reprocessing and enrichment, while other
non-nuclear-weapon states were denied these technologies.
The aftermath of the Gulf War revealed that Iraq had a covert
nuclear weapons programme; but the interesting point is that, at
that time the IAEA safeguards applied only to those installations
and fissile material that were declared in an agreement with the
IAEA. While the IAEA inspectors were regularly monitoring Iraq's
peaceful nuclear programmes, it had a parallel weapons effort that
did not intersect with the programme being monitored. Iraq had not
diverted fissile material from the peaceful to the military
programmes; hence it had not violated the provisions of its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
The objective of safeguards again changed in 1992 to prevention of
the transfer of capabilities for use in a non-nuclear-weapon state
in a nuclear explosive activity or an un-safeguarded nuclear fuel
cycle activity. A Modal Protocol has now prescribed a more intrusive
verification system. States accepting the Protocol are obliged to
provide information about their current and planned nuclear power
plants, IAEA inspectors would have access not only to nuclear sites
but also to their locations that would contribute to a nuclear
programme such as research in manufacturing capabilities. In
September 2003 when United States and the IAEA were insisting that
Iran should sign this Additional Protocol, only 37 NPT States had
actually signed it; even the United States had not signed it. Iran
has now agreed to subscribe to it.
More and more informal groups have been organized on the lines of
the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, such as the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group, and
the Wassenaar Agreement. The Nuclear Suppliers Group in its meeting
at Warsaw in 1992 adopted 40 documents bringing in a large number of
dual-use technologies within its prohibitory list. Nowadays all
cutting edge technologies have military as well as civilian uses;
any restrictions on them would not only control proliferation of
nuclear competence but would also encroach upon the developmental
process. For instance, simply because fertilizers can be used for
weapons purposes a ban on their import or use would definitely have
an adverse affect on agriculture. This is how increasingly intrusive
and increasingly longer lists of technologies are being brought
within the purview of the nuclear and chemical weapons
non-proliferation regimes.
The regime provided negative security guarantees to
non-nuclear-weapons states; in return for their renunciation of
nuclear weapons, they were assured of immunity from threats or use
of nuclear weapons against them. The Nuclear Posture Review of the
United States, which referred specifically to seven states against
which in certain contingencies the United States could use nuclear
weapons, eroded this assurance. The seven states include two
nuclear-weapons states, Russia and China, and five
non-nuclear-weapon states--Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria.
For the first time, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT have
been mentioned as possible targets of nuclear attacks.
The Proliferation Security Initiative
The distinguished Consul General has lucidly explained the concept
of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). I will simply ask a few
questions about it.
Eliminating the transport of materials and components for ABC
Weapons; i.e. atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and their
delivery systems to additional states would be a positive
development. India would certainly welcome it. The curbing of
nuclear and missile proliferation among China, Pakistan and North
Korea and sharing intelligence on their covert operations would
obviously meet India's national interests.
The manner in which the working of a covert global nuclear market
operating from Pakistan has been managed, however, does not inspire
confidence. The distinguished Consul General rightly pointed out
that the issue concerned the security of the United States as well
as of the entire international security. The acceptance by
Washington of the Pakistani claim that the entire operation was the
work of some 'rogue' scientists without the knowledge of successive
Pakistani governments amounts to selective application of
non-proliferation. Secretary of State Colin Powell has described it
as an internal matter for Pakistan. How can this be justified? The
Pakistani nuclear proliferation was proceeding for more than two
decades and the American intelligence agencies had been tracking
this process. CIA Director George Tenet has said that his
organization was tracking I.Q. Khan's activities for a long time.
Khan and his colleagues were publishing articles on centrifuge
technology in scientific journals and American experts were
monitoring them. Brochures were being distributed with Khan's
photograph in the circle of a mushroom cloud; exhibitions were being
held in Pakistan where these wares were being advertised for sale.
Yet the United States did not take any preventive action; it did not
even inform the IAEA about the subversion of the NPT regime.
Moreover, can we realistically absolve successive civilian and
military rulers of Pakistan by dismissing it as just a private
enterprise of 'rogue' scientist? It was the most audacious challenge
to the entire non-proliferation regime. In a strongly inverted
editorial, Washington Post had accused Pakistan of having committed
some of the worst crimes of nuclear weapons proliferation ever
committed. It added that were Pakistan not a professed ally of
United States, its behavior would have met the criteria for
preventive military intervention outlined in President Bush's
national security strategy.
When the proponents of the PSI mention sharing information, this is
one area India is directly interested in. The United States has not
shared information about the black market with India. It is not
sharing intelligence information according to New York Times and
Washington Post even with Japan. What is the assurance that under
the PSI it is not going to be a one-way traffic: Indian information
would be available to Washington while the vast amount of
information collected by the United States would not be shared with
India.
Who determines a particular country as a state of concern? Would a
small group of states continue to decide that a country is a state
of concern, or a rogue state? How reliable would be intelligence
regarding a particular shipment; would it be prudent to rely on
intelligence agencies already compromised by the fiasco of Iraq?
According to John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control in International Security, the PSI is not an organization
but an activity; and because it is not an organization, it doesn't
have any rules and regulations although there are certain
guidelines. In other words, it will be an informal gathering of
like-minded states who will decide which country is a state of
concern and who's ships or aircraft should be boarded and searched.
What would be the mechanism to interdict vessels under flags of
states not of concern but with shipments from states of concern?
Would the PSI target only states and non-state actors on the
preferences of core states? The members have not spelled out the
types of shipments they are targeting. The reference to weapons of
mass destruction and delivery systems and 'related materials'
creates ambiguities about the meaning of related material. This has
not been defined. Related material could cover anything including
fertilizers.
The NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons
Convention all expressively provide signatory states the right to
possess and trade dual-use technologies There is need for clarity
and international consensus to be developed on the types of
transfers prohibited and the nature of interdiction permitted under
international law. Naval interdiction by an informal coalition of
states would raise major political and legal problems that cannot be
wished away. Poland, for instance is a member of the core group; how
can Poland play any role in naval interdiction because of its
limited capabilities? Only United States maintains global naval
presence. So it will be primarily an American operation. What would
be the rules of engagement for such an activity that could
contribute to global instability by flouting the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea? Russia and China have expressed concern that PSI
is an attempt to substitute interdiction for established
multilateral thinking and is tailored to isolate specific states,
specifically North Korea.
Interdiction of aircraft would raise the prospect of accidents
involving such dangerous material; how to interdict an aircraft on
what sources of information? American spokesmen have stated that
their country could consider, as a last resort, shooting down a
suspected aircraft if it refuses to land; but this would be the most
dangerous operation. Suppose American intelligence is correct and
the aircraft is carrying nuclear fissile material and it is shot
down, what would the consequence be?
The text of the Security Council Resolution 1540 has various
ambiguities in it. The objective placed before the Security Council
was to prevent only terrorist groups from acquiring ABC weapons. The
draft resolution was revised thrice in order to satisfy the concerns
of a country, Pakistan, that has been involved in the world's
greatest proliferation activity, India's a permanent representative
at the United Nations has expressed concern that the exercise of
legislative function by the Security Council, combined with the
recourse to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, raised serious questions.
The Charter does not confer on the Security Council the authority to
enact global legislation demanding sovereign states to modify their
domestic laws and policies. It can be done by multilateral
negotiations between sovereign states. Moreover, the track record of
the Security Council on disarmament issues is not a happy one. For
example, before the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the United States and
the Soviet Union conducted 116 nuclear tests in a single year, and
many of them were atmospheric tests spreading radioactive fallout
far and wide. The Security Council did not take note of it. But when
India and Pakistan conducted a few nuclear tests in 1998, it
immediately produced a condemnatory resolution.
Even at the latest NPT PrepCom meeting, US representative Wolf said
that the United States policy is that India, Pakistan and Israel
sign the NPT. India cannot be a party to a non-proliferation regime
that refuses to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon power. India is not
a member of the groupings like the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear
Supplier Group, MTCR, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar
Agreement and is, therefore, naturally cautious of joining another
informal grouping like the Proliferation Security Initiative
designed to enforce the nonproliferation regime. What is needed is a
new international consensus on non-proliferation instead of reliance
on more additional groupings of states that have over the years
almost nullified the provisions of the NPT. The international
community should develop new non-proliferation norms in a
multilateral forum and this should be done within the framework of
international law. Moreover, these norms should be implemented
impartially and not whimsically to suit the national interests of a
particular state.
Session II - Legal Dimensions and Future of Nuclear Proliferation
Legal Dimensions of
Implementing PSI
Prof. V.S. Mani
Director, Gujurat National University
The concept of PSI struck me even as it came through the news in
September 2003. This is not the first time something like PSI was
being used against countries like North Korea. BBC news online 5th
September 2003 reported that in December 2002, Spain intercepted a
North Korean ship carrying scud missiles and handed over the vessel
to United States. We are now faced with the process of 'formalizing'
PSI as an alliance system. It is, however, instructive to look at
the context in which the new alliance system takes shape. A US
handout says that the target entities of the PSI system are of two
categories - countries like North Korea and 'non-state entities', i.
e. some select 'terrorist' groups.
The United Nations has been grappling at least at the normative level with the problem of 'elimination' of international terrorism. By now there are some 12 international treaties and 7 regional conventions. Since 1992, the problem came to be increasingly focused and started repeatedly appearing on the agenda of the Security Council. Since then the great powers were given the opportunity to use the Security Council for conceptualizing and seeking to implement a sort of PSI, at least against the terrorist groups. The result, of course, was the resolution, Prof. Zuberi referred to in his presentation, Resolution 1540 of 2004 adopted on 28th April 2004. I have no difficulty in reading this resolution as terrorism-specific, as it is formulated as one of the Council responses to international terrorism. Normally resolutions of international bodies do not contain footnotes but this resolution has footnotes. There is a star footnote on the first page, which says "definitions for the purpose of this resolution only." These are definitions of three terms, namely, "means of delivery," "non-state actor" ("individual or entity not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which come within the scope of this resolution"), and "related material." Prof Zuberi was pondering aloud over the meaning of "related material:" the definition is found in the resolution. Although not too specific, the definition is adequate for the purposes of understanding the rationale behind the resolution.
The context should also include the issue of disarmament. By the 1954, it was insisted by Jawaharlal Nehru at his UN General Assembly annual interventions that the issues of disarmament should be dealt with multilaterally not unilaterally, as not only the great powers, but all members of the international community had seminal interest in pursuing the goal of disarmament. But now things are being dealt with through 'collective unilateralism:' it begins with one individual State, usually a great power, then eventually in order to seek legitimacy it becomes collective unilateralism.
I would present three points on PSI from a legal perspective:
1. Unilateralism.
2. Use of force under the UN Charter.
3. Law of the Sea.
On unilateral actions there is a general rule, as formulated by the International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case in 1951. The Court ruled that while a State has considerable freedom of action, when a conduct of State has international implications, the legality of that conduct should be subject to determination by International Law. In other words, the burden is on the state concerned to justify its action in terms of legitimacy and acceptability under International Law. I would therefore look at unilateral acts of states from this perspective.
What we have here is what I would call as 'collective unilaterlism' to force selective disarmament. The trend began with the London Club in 1975, then MTCR in 1987, then Australia club in 1992, Wassenaar Club in 1995, and now The Hague Group of 2002. Particularly the last two have all brought about restrictions and embargoes in free international transfers of what these clubs deem to be dual use technologies. The problem with these clubs is that they are very loose clubs, they don't even have Articles of Association (let alone any treaty basis), except for certain generally agreed guidelines and these guidelines get broadened over and over again, at the instance of a great power. If these guidelines are implemented by national legislation by a 'participant' country, by even extending their import to transactions between and in non-participating countries, the result of that kind of implementation is felt to the detriment of these countries. We in India have been familiar with such arbitrary extraterritorial application of national laws by the US. In the 1992-93 cryogenic engine controversy Russia was arm-twisted to back out of the technology transfer obligations under the erstwhile Indo-Russian Cryogenic Engine Technology Agreement even as both India and Russia (at that time) were not parties to MTCR. Washington put the heat on Moscow and Moscow backed out of the agreement giving India five additional cryogenic engines in return for the abrogation/renegotiation of the agreement. So such 'collective unilateral' arrangements as MTCR would give lead to acts of dubious legality.
Prof. Zuberi highlighted discrimination in the realm of disarmament. Why is it that the P5 can legitimately acquire and hold nuclear weapons and others cannot. If others do it, it is illegal, in terms of the NPT. But when the P5 hold and vertically multiply nuclear weapons there is nothing wrong with it. The non-P5 should not also transfer nuclear weapons or their technology. Do we have any international peremptory norm prohibiting development or transfer of nuclear weapons or any other weapons only with respect to certain countries and not to others. Or is the privilege of the P5 to determine this? Peremptory norms can only be non-discriminatory - except on ground of equity. We cannot have a selective, discriminatory international framework of norms and institutional mechanism that would treat a small group of states privileged in view of their superior military power. Any international disarmament monitoring or enforcing mechanism, by its very definition, must have authority over all states without any discrimination. I would assess the validity and legitimacy of PSI from that angle. PSI tries to cater for the interests of a few countries, primarily some of the great powers. Could we seek answers to global issues of disarmament in this way? This is a question to ponder over.
The second aspect is use of force. The law relating to use of force is of course very clear although this is the very law which is being violated repeatedly. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter clearly says: " All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." There are two kinds of situations in which use of force is permissible: one, organizational action by the Security Council, and the other Article 51 right of self-defence. The Council now authorizes PSI. Does PSI fall within the right of self-defence? The answer would be No because you need an armed attack to invoke the right of self-defense. Security Council resolution 1540 is terrorism-specific. It is non-state actor specific. The PSI allows some states to act outside the UN Charter framework of control of force and yet insists legitimacy.
The third aspect is the Law of the Sea. There are two critical areas in this regard, one is the law relating to the territorial sea and the other, that of the high seas. The way in which the provisions on territorial waters came to be adopted in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has had a long history. Earlier the complaint of the countries of blue water navies was that the coastal states could at a moment's notice declare any passage as non-innocent and that there were no objective criteria particularly in Article 16 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea of 1958 (which dealt with the passage through straits). The issue was quite extensively debated. In order to eliminate the chances of subjective application of the concept of innocent passage by the coastal states, the UN Convention of 1982 came up with objective criteria, yet protecting the coastal state rights to tackle any problems of security, and law and order. Let the coastal state handle these problems in its own way within the framework of 1982 Convention. Why PSI? Or would PSI give a handle to a foreign state to enter into a coastal state's territorial waters and apply PSI principles even without consulting the latter.
With the regime of the High Seas, the ruling principle has been freedom of the high seas. There was a time, not long ago, when the freedom of the high seas was interpreted by the United States, as implying a right for it not to affirm or deny that its ships carried nuclear weapons: this was about 10 or 15 years ago, and precisely for this reason United States was quite unwilling to be a party to protocols of many of the regional nuclear free zone treaties. PSI represents an about-turn. I don't declare whether my ships carry nuclear weapons or not but you better come clean on it. If you don't, I step on you on suspicion that you carry nuclear weapons. One finds this to a highly arbitrary use of the freedom of the high seas principle. An equally lofty principle of the High Seas is that each state must respect the rights of the others. Each shall exercise its rights with due regard to the rights of others.
For all these reasons PSI is of highly doubtful legality.
The topic can be
addressed in the following three points
1. What is the nature of the crisis facing the nuclear
non-proliferation regime?
2. What does this mean to the NPT and its related elements?
3. What are India's options?
In terms of the nature of the crisis, there are two major crises. One is a kind of a quasi crisis. This is the crisis of what we know of as the A.Q Khan affair, the whole issue of nuclear commerce or nuclear smuggling and the supply of nuclear material from Pakistan and I would suggest that this is not a very serious crisis; this is unlikely to happen again. It had primarily happened because of the fact that there was a misperception about the direction of the nuclear proliferation that Pakistan was involved in. The assumption was that much of the weapons were going into Pakistan. The United States did not realize that a lot of it was also going out of Pakistan.
So there was a kind of misperception. For example, the North Korean link: there were analysts in Delhi who were writing about the possibility that just as Pakistan was getting missiles from North Korea, Pakistan was possibly also supplying something to the North Koreans. It is not that people didn't realize it but that the reverse direction was not taken seriously enough. This could happen again if it suited the United States and the other major powers to look the other way, as has happened several times. So this is not a fundamental threat to the regime as such, this is a matter of policy and that of political convenience.
The two major types of challenges to the NPT regime are, one the
breakout possibility, that the countries that do not have nuclear
weapons and are members of the Non Proliferation Treaty, would
become nuclear weapons states. This is concerned primarily with Iran
and North Korea and also with India, Pakistan and Israel. If we look
at the number of cases here, there are only four to five cases. In
the 1960's it was thought that by 1995 there would be 25 countries
that would become nuclear powers. Clearly this has not happened. So
the seriousness of this as a threat is over rated. Iran clearly
violated its commitments, but Iran was caught in that twilight zone
where if not caught it would have turned nuclear. Iran's activities
were detected before it could actually become a nuclear weapons
state. So much of attention is focused on Iran right now that the
possibility that Iran will be able to acquire sufficient amount of
fissile material and actually manufacture nuclear weapons is rather
remote. Iran's possible option now would be to do what India and to
some extent Pakistan did, which is to build up the civilian nuclear
infrastructure slowly, over decades. But the non-proliferation
regime has been getting tighter in terms of verification and
inspection and so Iran's capacity to go nuclear has been eliminated
or is rather likely to be eliminated.
North Korea has successfully managed that twilight period and has
actually managed to cross that point of becoming a nuclear power and
if North Korean claim is to be believed they have already
manufactured a couple of nuclear weapons. So North Korea represents
the case of a successful proliferation while Iran represents a case
of failed proliferation. North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel
have managed to build up nuclear capabilities sufficiently before
being detected by the United States. The situation in North Korea is
very difficult because it is no longer non-proliferation; the
situation is now of rolling back the nuclear weapons capability and
that is always much more difficult than preventing countries from
going nuclear.
But what the Iranian case and the North Korean case demonstrate is that the bar has constantly moved upwards, as Prof. Zuberi already pointed out. The bar in terms of crossing the nuclear threshold, the difficulty level of a non-nuclear country wanting to go nuclear has consistently moved upwards from the time the non-proliferation treaty was signed. So for any new proliferant, the bar is so high that it will very likely be impossible to cross. So the crisis in terms of more countries becoming nuclear is unlikely. North Korea is likely to be the last successful proliferant.
But there is one group of countries, which could break out and become nuclear. These are the countries that are within the NPT and which have built up sufficient industrial capabilities, countries like Japan, Germany, Canada, Sweden, and Australia. For these countries, it is a political decision. For example, if Japan wants to go nuclear, it does not have to build up a nuclear industrial capability; they just have to take a political decision to go nuclear. They already have the delivery capability and the nuclear technological capability. The political decision until now has been not to go nuclear even though there has been a continuous underground debate within Japan about the possibility of going nuclear. So this is the first type of crisis, of countries within the NPT who have built up their civilian nuclear capability deciding to go nuclear.
The second type of crisis is that of United States changing its views about non-proliferation. Many international regimes and laws are primarily dependent on how the great powers behave and what their interests are. International regimes do not come up because the weak powers want them to come up; for example in 1970's the NIEO, the New International Information Order etc., were all proposed by the third world countries but nothing happened. Whereas when you compare the fortunes of disarmament towards that of non-proliferation again nuclear disarmament primarily coming from the third world and from the non-nuclear states and the proliferation demand primarily from the developed and the powerful states, we can see that non-proliferation has had more success than disarmament. So the most important countries are the countries that are the most powerful and for the non-proliferation regime to be under serious threat would mean that the United States loses faith in the non-proliferation regime. This would mean serious trouble just as in the case of biological weapons convention, CTBT and nuclear disarmament.
But the US has too much at stake in the NPT and in any case all the arguments in Washington about how NPT has failed is only strengthening the regime because what it leads to is other countries fearing that United States will walk out and therefore conceding that the regime should be tightened. When we look at the history of the regime, it is a case of violations of the regime, which in turn made the regime stronger. The 1974 nuclear test conducted by India led to domestic non-proliferation legislation and Nuclear Suppliers Group. In 1980's Pakistani proliferation led to several international non-proliferation norms; the 1991 Gulf War detected Iraqi violations and led to the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and some of the post 1998 events including detection of A.Q Khan's role in proliferation led to a whole host of activities to strengthen the regime. PSI is one aspect of this. There was also a talk of preventing non-nuclear weapon states from getting the complete nuclear fuel cycles, the arguments being that a country that is not nuclear does not need a fuel cycle. So the implicit bargain in NPT about countries giving up military nuclear technology in exchange for civilian nuclear technology also faces a threat, in addition to the fact that the bargain over nuclear disarmament was already completely out of the treaty. The threat that the United States might walk out is itself leading to the strengthening of the regime.
What is the implication for the NPT regime? There are four main implications. One is that the NPT regime over all will become even stricter; PSI is one aspect of that strengthening of that regime. Over a period of time we can expect nuclear research, power generation and nuclear civilian transfers coming under threat. The second would be that the inspection regime would become much more stricter. The prospects for the third world countries going nuclear are around zero. Japan and other industrialized countries have the potential from this point onwards for going nuclear. Finally the NPT lobby will become stronger. It has already become stronger in Washington. This is bad news for India as well as for the regime because there will be more legislations and attempts outside the NPT structure to create quasi groups which would lead to further tightening of the regime.
The implications for India can be described again in four points. When the regime gets tighter, Indian and Pakistani position will become that much more harder and from the prospective of New Delhi in particular, we will continue to be clubbed with the Pakistanis, irrespective of the record of Pakistani proliferation. We will not get much out of proving that Indians are the good guys and Pakistanis the bad ones in terms of proliferation because as this regime gets tighter and tighter we are going to be clubbed more and more with the Pakistanis. Second, assuming that the Bush administration continues for another four years and taking in account its unilateral approach, there could be opportunities for a political deal in the United States, even though its possibilities are remote for various reasons. As it becomes more skeptical of the NPT's usefulness and as the non-proliferation fundamentalists in Washington become stronger, the possibility of a political deal becomes that much less likely. In the last couple of years India-US dialogue has stagnated because of the fact that the non-proliferation fundamentalists in Washington have become stronger. There has been a debate in Washington between the State department and the Defense department a variety of issues like the sale of Israeli Arabs missiles to India, conclusion of agreements on other nuclear technologies, trinity issues etc. The State department has always been much less willing to agree on concessions to India.
The third point is the possibility for India to have a kind of strategic proliferation policy, which is also remote. Several countries have practiced strategic proliferation. The United States and France helped or looked the other way when Israel was becoming a nuclear power and China actively helped Pakistan become a nuclear power. There have been post-cold war debates in Washington about the possibility of other strategic proliferation of countries such as Japan, Germany and Ukraine becoming nuclear powers. The debates have been on the issue of whether it is good for the United States or bad for the United States. India has never had such debates; we have always been more anti proliferationist than even the non-proliferation fundamentalists.
Finally some of the stricter measures and restrictions will have an effect on India directly. None of the discussions with United States about the Trinity issues and the NSSP (Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership) are taking a firm shape. There is opposition from the US State department on any concessions to India even on the issue of third countries like France or Russia supplying nuclear power plants to India. Nuclear power plants are something India is eagerly looking forward to. So the problem is that we have never had a debate about whether proliferation is good for India or not. This rules out the possibility of a compromise that could lead to a negotiation with the United States.
Session III - ISPS and Container Security
ISPS as an Instrument of PSI
Cmde R.S. Vasan (Retd.)
Expert on Maritime Security
In the forenoon
session, a lot has been discussed about PSI which is aimed at
preventing proliferation of WMD and also includes bilateral
agreements providing for inspection, shipment of cargo, interdiction
and boarding and search of suspect vessels. It makes my job simpler
for correlating issues of ISPS with that of PSI and present a total
picture as these two initiatives intrude on maritime security in the
back drop of maritime threats, particularly, maritime terrorism.
Advantages of The Seas
The oceans confer many advantages for nations as they serve the
economic means of transportation, right of innocent passage, free
trade and more importantly, the relative freedom from the cumbersome
application of laws that apply on land. So it does not come to us as
a surprise, that over 90 percent of the worlds trade in volume and
over 80 percent in value of goods use the sea routes. It is
therefore vital for the very sustenance of economies. The advantages
of the seas are conferred equally upon any one who can sail at sea,
perhaps even with a small boat.
Terrorist Attacks at Sea
USS Cole an Aegis class ship was off Aden in Oct 2000 and was routinely having a boat for help along side. Two terrorists detonated the boat alongside fully loaded with explosives resulting in extensive damages and death of 17 US crew. Two years later in October 2002, a French tanker Limburg was the target of terrorist bomb attack in the same waters with unprecedented environmental damage as she was carrying over 390,000 barrels of oil. The attack on USS Cole in October 2000 and the attack on French tanker Limburg in October 2002 and the increased piracy incidents worldwide brought to fore the vulnerability of ships including warships at sea.
With suicide attacks being legitimized by certain groups and having become an accepted norm to disrupt and demoralize target nations and/or groups, the need to be prepared, to meet such eventualities became even more important. While 9/11, and closer home, the attack on the parliament, Akshardam temple and the unending cross border terrorism in Kashmir brought to focus the ugly dimensions of terrorism, it urged nations to review their own security preparedness to combat terrorism at many levels. It also brought nations together on many related issues and rendered it easy to adopt common procedures and practices. This enabled achievement of enhanced levels of preparedness, seeking to prevent and being prepared for acts of terrorism both on land and at sea.
Birth of ISPS
Propelled by the need of the hour as well as sustained lobbying by the US, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) held many meetings commencing in 2002 to discuss implementation of measures by member states to enhance the level of security and preparedness both on ships and the ports they serviced. The whole hearted acceptance of proposed measures which came to be known as International Ship and Port Security code (ISPS) by over 160 member states reflects the high level of concern amongst the sea faring nations about maritime threats. The world community had already accepted the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) in 1974. The ISPS was included as an addition to SOLAS.
The objectives of the ISPS code
· To detect / assess security threats.
· To take preventive measurers against security incidents affecting
ships and port facilities involved in international trade.
· To establish rules for inspections.
· To collate and exchange security related information.
· To ensure that plans and procedures are in place to react to
changing security levels.
· To ensure confidence amongst seafarers.
Highlights
The ISPS code was promulgated in two parts namely part A and part B. The first part contained the mandatory requirements, which were to be implemented by ships, ports and ship owners. The second part was more a guideline document, which contained the ways in which ports, ships and ship owners could implement the provisions. The provisions contained, cater for a three tier security level to be achieved and maintained depending on the assessed threat. The rules were made applicable to passenger ships including high-speed cargo ships and high-speed crafts of 500 tons GRT. It was also made applicable to off shore trading units and pot facilities. By definition, the inland container terminals were considered as extensions of the port facility and therefore they were brought into the ambit of the security umbrella of ISPS.
According to the ISPS, each ship should have a trained security officer without absolving the traditional responsibilities of the Master of the vessel. Similarly, each port has to have a Security officer to ensure compliance with ISPS code and to maintain link with other agencies during any situation. Each company was also required to appoint a security officer for overseeing and coordination with the port on a regular basis. The security officer was required to have full knowledge of the required response mechanism and should also have the competence for dealing with situations of threat.
Ships and crafts were to be equipped with alarm systems and an Automatic Information System (AIS). This would enable tracking by owners and security agencies. This feature would greatly assist in the cases of piracy or terrorist threats of hijacking. Access control to Bridge and Engine room were required to be in place. The requirement of the CSR (Continuous Synopsis Record) was to ensure that the problems of stowaways did not occur. As per the agreement, the contracting nations had to implement the necessary measures by 1st July 2004. The record so far indicates that nations have competed with one another to beat the deadline.
India does it differently?
While most of the nations have nominated the Coast Guard or the Navy
to oversee the compliance with ISPS, India has surprised everyone by
nominating the IRS (Indian Registrar of Shipping) an agency, which
hitherto was the ship surveyor. The MMD has admitted that they have
the qualification, the expertise or the manpower to take on the role
of the security services; it appears that, both the Indian Navy and
the Coast Guard have remained silent spectators. The report in media
also suggests that USCG may be involved for the audit of our ports.
This piece is even more disturbing. There can be no better way to
compromise our security. We have our own qualified personnel to
carry out such audit when ever and as often as necessary. The nation
continues to spend crores on both the Navy and the Coast Guard to
provide quality training and keep them prepared to combat terrorism
and unlawful acts at sea both in peace and war. In my opinion, this
requires immediate correction before the terrorists get the better
of the favorable situation in our waters. We have a pool of trained
professionals who are on call round the clock.
Sample Reactions
It would be worthwhile to see how the world has reacted to the
implementation of the fully comprehensive maritime code that the
majority has accepted as unavoidable and appears fully justified.
On the flip side, the arguments that tried to oppose the code were that
·The cost of shipping operations would go up affecting business
revenue and profits.
·There would be greater curbs on civil liberties.
·Curtailment of freedom of movement along with infringement of
privacy and inviolability of an individual.
·Racial profiling once reserved for African Americans now for Arab
Americans
·Anglers banned from East London west pier and Cape Town water front
regattas will not take place. Etc.
One would notice none of these are very serious considering the advantages that the ISPS would provide to the signatory nations.
On implementation, it is evident that the ships that have not been certified as compliant would not be allowed to enter ports and invite boarding, search and inspection by security agencies for establishing credentials of the suspect vessel. Similarly, ports, which choose to opt out of the ISPS, would not be visited by ships and would affect the trade of that port just as the shipping community would shun Ship owners who opt out of the loop. So it is clear that almost all the ports would be under the security umbrella provided by the provisions of ISPS. The system in addition to the initial certification of ships, ports and companies would use electronic connectivity to build up databases and to exchange information about the type of cargo, passenger manifest and details of the voyage. This would assist in evaluating potential target ships for further follow up investigation in respect of violators.
Linkages with the PSI
During the deliberations of the provisions of the ISPS code itself,
there was a strong recommendation for the PSI provisions to be
included in the ISPS code. However, PSI itself took a different path
and did not want to be identified as an organization, It was to be
an activity which was mostly to be confined to the "haves" who
wanted to deny the technologies to the "have-nots". However, there
are enough and more to provide the necessary linkages to the PSI
activity. This can be easily illustrated. The very scheme of things
in ISPS caters for a transparency of the surface plots of all
traders with full details of cargo passengers, the details of the
last port of call and whether such a port was an ISPS compliant
port. Then the inputs and the data available are analyzed with the
help of appropriate custom built software where experts in the field
would short list offenders in respect of proliferation. Once the
mechanism is in place, the major route for proliferation would be
plugged.
With leading technology for containers coming from the US and the introduction of smart containers, availability of information of nature of cargo, destination, credentials of both the dispatcher and the consignee would be available at a click. The only watchword here is that there was enough information available on the possible attack on the WTC at the same click, yet the contingency buttons were not pressed in time and the right actions cried for attention. It has now come to light that 9/11 was indeed avoidable. It is hoped that the lessons have been learnt and the same mistakes would be not committed in respect of ISPS violations.
The Disturbing Facts
The issues of WMD need to be looked at in the background of some disturbing factors, which crave for attention. With due apologies to my American friends here, I must remind the audience about some of these key factors that have influenced the behavior of nations and groups in the last century. Some of these undisputed facts are-
·Since the realization of the potential of nuclear weapons, the only nation that has used an atomic weapon in anger is the USA. The loss of lives and the devastating damage done in Hiroshima and Nagasaki continue to haunt sane minds to date.
·The Agent Orange, a chemical that was used in Vietnam was the handiwork of the same superpower that today is determined to even wage a war based on a remote suggestion of the use of WMD. While millions died in Vietnam, the plight of those living and even those born with unimaginable birth defects is something that will upset any one who visits the country
·The nuclear stockpile held by US is more than adequate to annihilate the world and its inhabitants many times over.
·The devastating effects of Anthrax were sought to be used by the Allies against Germany with out any consideration to the loss of lives and misery that would be brought about by such use of a biological weapons. The money spent on qualitative improvements made to their arsenal and weapon delivery systems on a regular basis is offset by arms export deals in which older technology can be sold in the arms market of the third world countries. Does this fuel the arms race is perhaps a moot point.
The world community has criticized both in US and the war on Iraq, as it apparently was entirely based on false or beefed up intelligence bringing the credibility factor of the super power to disrepute. In fact this has become a key election issue and the Presidential nominee Mr. Kerry during his election speech last week has vowed not to lead US to such avoidable wars. The shipments of missiles, centrifuge components from North Korea and missiles from China are all cases that required punitive actions. The reality on the ground is that it is perhaps easy to go to war on Iraq, but the same yardstick cannot be applied to China or Pakistan. In fact, there is a growing feeling that Pakistan has been rewarded with the major Non NATO ally status for all the nuclear proliferation blunders.
That fact sheet was just aimed at providing some undisputable facts, which need to be borne in mind while analyzing the actions of those affected by unilateral actions of a super power. Some Americans may even argue, that they realized their grave mistakes in using the Atomic weapon and are atoning this sin by ensuring that no one else uses the NBC weapons. But, whether the UK and US are more responsible today is debatable in the wake of the unwarranted attack on Iraq which has brought about more damage, has rendered millions homeless, and has affected the quality of living in Iraq which was once home to ancient civilization.
Conclusion
The statement of the Indian Prime Minister at the BIMSTEC sets the tone for keeping terrorism in focus. There is a need to address both the perceived and actual wrongs committed in the past to see that these perceptions do not isolate nations, groups and communities. As far as, maritime terrorism is concerned, it has to be dealt with an Iron hand. Whether it is the Malacca Straits Patron, the ISPS or the PSI, the ultimate aim is to ensure free trade and commerce to assist the global economic activity and prosperity of nations in a terror free environment. The ISPS as an instrument to combat maritime terrorism and to assist PSI directly and indirectly is here to stay. There may be some loopholes but these would be plugged soon.
However, just as in the case of the WTC or our own parliament attack, the terrorists could at times be ahead of the mechanisms aimed at preventing them. They will perhaps continue to innovate and succeed as they have done in the past by outwitting counter terrorist means and methods. While these processes aimed at counter terrorism are timely and needed, the simultaneous examination and understanding of the route causes with a view to address them would yield rich collective dividends. Those involved in the" Hunter and the Hunted" game are very aware that once you have chosen to mount the tiger, you cannot afford to get off!
Container Security
Mr. John Gorkowski
Political/Economic Officer
US Consulate, Chennai
Let me thank the Centre for Security Analysis and General Raghavan for giving me this opportunity and to Adm Mohan Raman for facilitating the discussions.
My topic today is Container Security Initiative. Container Security Initiative is an activity initiated by US Customs and Border Protection Agency in response to the attacks of 9/11 in the year 2002. It aims to put teams of customs professionals in ports around the world to target containers that pose a risk of terrorism. Containerized shipping is extremely vulnerable. The global economy depends on it; nearly 90% of the world's trade moves by containers and in that 50% of US inputs measured in value enter US by containers. CSI proposes to intensify targeting and screening of containers at ports worldwide before they are loaded and sent to their final destinations. There are several factors involved in censoring containers and determining whether they are harmful or not. It provides the United States industry an additional outreach for cooperation, idea generation and data collection.
The four key elements of CSI are: -
· Establish security criteria for identifying containers that may pose a risk of terrorism, based on advance information.
· Pre-screen containers at the earliest possible point.
· Use technology to quickly pre-screen containers that may pose a risk for terrorism.
· Develop secure and "smart" containers.
They can be brought down to two points, screen containers and inspect those that you feel contain harmful materials. This is to, first, share information about target containers. The idea is not to search every container but only those that we fear may contain harmful material. The second is to improve screening technology. The preferred technologies are NII i.e. Non Intrusive inspection technologies, X ray machines that detect explosive traces etc.
The key benefits of CSI are: -
· Significantly increases ability to intercept containers that may pose a terrorist threat.
· Increases security of the global trading system.
· Facilitates smooth movement of legitimate trade.
· Protects port infrastructures.
· Enhances safety and security for all.
· Gives a competitive advantage to the trade.
· International reciprocity.
· Insurance, deterrence.
These benefits go beyond the borders of the United States. There are specific benefits for those nations who participate in the CSI. First, the systematic approach to screening and inspection of suspect containers make every port secure. It also makes the system of trade more secure and enables and naval intelligence to make progress after an incident to facilitate continued movement of goods and continued free trade. It can help protect the port infrastructure and the people who work at the port. It gives CSI participants an advantage over non-participants, the containers can move quickly as they will be screened in the participating country before they reach the US. It not only protects the US from dangerous and banned cargo but it protects the ports of participating countries as well and if a port is doing an effective job of screening material terrorists are less likely to use it as a conduit. The United States also has a program whereby customs officials from participating countries can perform the same functions at the US ports. Right now Japan and Canada have customs officials stationed in United States conducting this sort of activity on containers bound to their countries. They also have the opportunity to share training. Current CSI ports are operating in various places at Canada, Europe, Asia and Africa.
The minimum standards for CSI participation are as under: -
· Seaport must have regular, direct, and substantial container traffic.
· Customs officials must be able to inspect cargo originating, transiting, exiting, or being transshipped through the port.
· Non-intrusive inspection (NII) equipment (gamma or X-ray) and radiation detection equipment must be available for use at or near the potential CSI port.
· Establish an automated risk management system.
· Share critical data, intelligence, and risk management information.
· Conduct a thorough port assessment and commit to resolving port infrastructure vulnerabilities.
· Maintain integrity of programs, and identify and combat breaches
in integrity.
The United States Customs and Border Protection Agency dispatches a
team to participate in countries and this team works in conjunction
with host country's customs officials, it essentially cooperates
with the host country that has consented to participate, the
American actors are ready to share their technology, their advice
and their experience. Inspections are actually conducted by the host
countries and observed by the CSI team. Low risk containers can pass
through quickly and this will help facilitate trade. The CSI aims to
achieve better information, which improves targeting decisions so
that the determination of containers for conducting full search is
quicker. The determinations will be made on the basis of the best
information available. Therefore providing for better facilitation
and enhanced security. Finally, I would like to stress that CSI is
not an intrusion on sovereignty; it is really a matter of
cooperation and collaboration.